Peacekeeping commitment has long tradition

provided a police perspective on peace missions, and gave an historical overview of the involvement of Australian police in international peacekeeping in the following paper which was presented as part of the Peacekeeping Study — Joint Services Course at the Joint Services Staff College in Canberra recently.

The first duty of a police officer — to cooperate with others in maintaining the normal state of society, is not unlike the core responsibility of peacekeeping — to keep the peace. It is a responsibility which all police officers must swear or affirm when beginning their careers, thereby making a commitment to the community.

Police organisations within Australia are based on the ‘modern policing' concept. The core responsibilities of this concept are:

  • Prevention of crime.
  • Protection of life and property.
  • Preservation of the peace.

In Australia, each state and territory has its own police service. The NSW Police Service is among the largest 10 or so police services in the world. The Western Australia Police Department has the responsibility for policing one of the largest land masses in the world — an area about one quarter the size of the USA. State and territory police services look after the needs of all the local governments, where the major emphasis is placed on community-based policing. The AFP is responsible for providing traditional, community-based policing services to the ACT, and the territories of Jervis Bay, Norfolk Island, Christmas Island and the Cocos (Keeling) Islands, the last two of which were former Colonies of Singapore.

At the national level, the AFP has wide responsibilities for matters affecting the nation as a whole.

Developing links with the international law enforcement community is a key role for the AFP. The arrangements which Australia has in place through the AFP include active participation in the international police organisation, Interpol, while the AFP has an overseas liaison officer network with officers located in 15 international cities.

The global perspective on organised crime has become all too apparent. Commonwealth law enforcement is adapting to changes in international crime trends to maintain Australia's reputation as a safe and stable society in which to conduct trade, investment and tourism activities.

Information and money is being moved increasingly by individuals and enterprises in a communications network which is becoming more difficult to regulate. In simple terms, the AFP's jurisdiction must be seen as being between Australia and the rest of the world. International peacekeeping, as a national responsibility, has been an important role for the AFP, and officers have served in numerous United Nations and multi-national forces.

Against this general background of policing within Australia, I will now focus more specifically on UN Peacekeeping which should be considered within the context that police cannot, and should not, take a military role in peace operations, but that they should be seen as an essential part of the UN peace support resource inventory, along with diplomacy and the military, in contributing to the achievement and maintenance of a sustainable peace.

Use of police in Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs)

The effectiveness of the use of professional police in PKOs, and the sustainability of the infrastructure they leave behind, depends on the environment in which they are required to operate. The most suitable environment for the effective use of the peacemaking process has the following characteristics:

  • All parties to the conflict have consented to, and are prepared to cooperate with the UN role.
  • The PKO has the full backing of the international community expressed through the support of the security council, and there is a willingness to contribute resources and finance the PKO.
  • The PKO is under UN command.
  • There is recognition that the PKO role is to demonstrate complete impartiality and neutrality between the parties.

While there is a need for these characteristics to be recognised by all contributors to the PKO, a further requirement which facilitates the acceptance of police within a community is the need for them to go about their business unarmed. While at times in numerous PKOs, threats against the safety of members have been relatively high, the AFP maintains that an unarmed policy has the greatest potential for success.

Why police?

The involvement of police adds a different dimension to the traditional peacekeeping model which involves diplomacy and military containment. It is a dimension which provides for a civilian and unarmed interaction within the community; the independent and professional investigation of alleged breaches of human rights; and through working with the community, the training and supervision of local police officials. All these ultimately contribute to restoring and maintaining peace.

While the structure and functions of police in UN PKOs vary with each operation, their activities share the same underlying principles: to uphold the rule of law; uphold the rights of individuals; and resolve incidents with the minimum use of force.

These are the principles on which a modern and professional police service within any democratic society is based. The protection of the rights of members of a community to pursue their legitimate interests peacefully and safely is fundamental to the democratic, economic and social wellbeing of any free society.

An analysis of recent PKOs will identify that the majority relate to internal, rather than external conflicts. Generally, internal conflicts have consistently displayed that the rule of law, the legal system, is either weak or has collapsed. For sustainable peace, it is imperative that society respects social expectations, and has the ability to respond when these levels are not attained. This response must be one with a capability to prevent, investigate, judge and correct any deviation from acceptable practice. This is achieved through an effective police, judicial and corrective system.

Police are able to contribute to this system by using both basic and advanced policing skills, which have been supplemented by specifically relevant environmental and cultural training. This equips the professional police officer so that he or she can contribute to UN mandates in different communities throughout the world. Roles to which these skills are directed include: establishing a civil authority presence; encouraging a peaceful and calm environment conducive to holding elections or pursuing other peace processes; the investigation of human rights violations and responding to the UN command; and providing training to, and the development of local police resources.

Pursuing these policy objectives within a UN operation facilitates the peace process, and provides an environment which is more likely to be sustainable after the withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping forces. A police presence in peacekeeping works well alongside a military presence, directly helping communities to establish a stable environment to allow the peace process to work effectively.

Distinct differences between police and military

Modern police organisations have evolved from their military origins. This in no way is to be taken as negative criticism. In fact, police are extremely proud of their heritage and maintain close links with their military colleagues in a number of ways. However, there are distinct differences between military and police personnel, and a failure to identify these differences will mean an under-utilisation of skills on joint operations. Although the outward appearances through the wearing of uniforms, and in some circumstances a paramilitary hierarchy, are similar, the ‘command' structure is quite the opposite. Police officers are empowered legally and organisationally to discharge responsibilities at the lowest level. The constable is required to exercise his/her powers and or discretion individually. In the exercise of police powers relating to a dispute between an offender and a victim, the constable is not subject to the direction of senior police. The formal accountability process is through the law — via the court — and not a senior police officer. The decision to arrest an offender is a power that is invested in the individual. It would be quite correct for a junior officer to decline a senior officer's direction to arrest an offender, if that member did not believe that it was appropriate. That member could quite correctly indicate to the more senior person that if he or she believed that the arrest was appropriate, then the more senior person should effect the arrest.

Police are trained to the doctrine of minimum force, whereas the military is primarily trained to the doctrine of maximum force. The day-to-day responsibilities of community police involve frequent operational command, conflict resolution, and crisis management. Police are expected to exercise their core responsibilities on a daily basis. On the other hand, the military train to maintain an ability to exercise their core responsibilities, but in our societies rarely need to.

Within our system of government, police are accountable to the public through the courts and therefore the law. This is a prime reason why there is a need to maintain real and clear separation between the police and the military. Although arguments for the subordination of police to military command within PKOs are frequent, and underpinned by calls for closer coordination, they should be resisted, and police independence strongly guarded. This is not to say that military command cannot request police to undertake specific tasks. Requests to undertake a task should be promoted, but should be outcome driven, that is, the request should be directed at an outcome. If the request is appropriate and achievable, it would be appropriate for police to decide on how to deliver the required outcome.

The option of using police for a task should always be the ‘non-military option', and should be seen and perceived by the people as such. This would build and maintain the independence that police need for their role to be sustainable. The request for ‘joint military and police patrols' should be considered within this context. If the people subject of the PKO cannot differentiate between military and police, our competitive advantage is lost.

When should police become involved?

Police expertise needs to be utilised in the earliest planning phase of UN intervention. Greater police involvement is required in the analysis of any proposed PKO. A longer term vision is required, so that the preferred outcomes of PKOs are sustainable. The planning should incorporate input from identified stakeholders. This includes aid measures through non-government organisations and police personnel. Like the reaction to a disaster, planning officials must recognise that sustainability of outcomes relies upon a recognition that responsibility for recovery transcends a number of organisations. The involvement of stakeholders at the planning phase is recognition that PKOs have a number of phases and these are inter-related.

Police intervention would ideally follow when organised, armed conflict has been contained, and there is a need to harness the community resources and protect it from disaffected elements, whether they be criminal or otherwise. Ideally, military and police can work together from the outset of an operation to ensure effective and sustainable peace is restored and maintained.

Functions which can be performed by police

Operational tasks
  • Investigation of criminal offences.
  • Specialist investigations, including assistance to human rights investigations, investigating genocide, election fraud.
  • Provision of police advisers.
  • Scientific support to investigations.
  • Preservation of civil order, through planning and implementation of security (crowd control) operations.
  • Resolution of disputes between civilians.
  • Controlling and apprehension of civilians in protected areas.
  • Monitoring and/or control of police and their investigations.
  • Escort of civilians through disputed areas.
  • Maintenance of the peace at major incidents, including security of the electoral process
Training functions
  • Training of local police officers in general policing, investigations and specialist areas such as close protection and rudimentary scientific support.
  • Training of UN military in crowd psychology and crowd control function.
Humanitarian functions
  • Medivac transfers.
  • Family reunion.
  • Prisoner and body (funeral) escorts.
  • Prison visits.
  • Medical/pharmaceutical delivery to civilians.
  • Patrols to assist aid delivery.
  • Identification of deceased persons.

When are police actually police?

One of the major criticisms of police in previous PKOs was they could not undertake basic police tasks, such as minor investigations. This was due to the deployment of personnel as police, when in some cases the deployed members have never undertaken police training or community police functions.

This was particularly so in the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), where the UNTAC Police Commissioner Klaas Roos commented on the standards of some of the police participating in the mission: ". . . too many police monitors were not in possession of a valid drivers licence or failed the simple drivers test, too many police monitors were unable to express themselves in the official mission languages, too many police monitors were not instructed on the CIVPOL mandate, and even a number of ‘police monitors' lacked police experience in community and/or field policing. Some were dressed in police uniforms without even being a policeman".

The UN addressed this by setting minimum standards for the deployment of police monitors. The AFP ensures that deployed members exceed basic standards by requiring all prospective peacekeepers to address selection criteria prior to interview and subsequent deployment. Set selection criteria require the member to research the mission extensively, as well as the nation's history, and therefore its culture. This process promotes self learning, the success of which is addressed at individual interviews.

When police are most effective

The utilisation of local skills and resources provides the most effective form of intervention, supplemented by the deployment of small professional teams of police. Teams deployed need to be capable of identifying and harnessing local resources, then where appropriate, undertaking training and development. This should be followed by overseeing local police operations. This is a far more cost effective method than deploying large numbers of often inadequately and inappropriately equipped and trained international police personnel.

In short, civilian police involvement in peacekeeping should not be seen as a numbers game, but as a base which is able to organise and enhance indigenous resources towards a sustainable peace outcome.

Provision of Australian police to PKOs, and its impact on Australian jurisdictions

Australian police have contributed to PKOs since 1964. This has been primarily through the AFP (and one of its predecessors the Commonwealth Police). Present budget provision exists for 20 personnel to be deployed. Apart from this, no capacity exists within Australian police services, and in particular the AFP, to respond to UN requirements without supplementation. Police strengths in Australia are set by respective Australian and state/territory governments based on their own jurisdictional requirements and priorities. They are presently unable to maintain reserve capabilities.

A response to UN requests must, therefore, have an impact on the ability of police services to perform their primary roles. The extent of this impact depends on the commitment required, the length of time of an operation, and the ability of the respective police services to supplement their resources during the deployment period.

The AFP has been able to respond to modest demands from within its own resources as long as the government has been able to fund the contribution. The level of response, putting aside the Cyprus contingent, would be up to 40 – 50 personnel for a short term. Any rotation of these personnel would require the recruitment of new members.

Beyond this level, the AFP would be required to seek the assistance of state/territory police. While this increases the ‘pool' of resources available to about 40,000 personnel, it needs to be recognised that a similar impact would be felt on ongoing operations and financial supplementation would be crucial to enable respective governments to positively consider requests.

A further dimension which complicates the participation of state and territory police services, apart from their financial and policing priorities, is the need to establish a single command structure with common terms and conditions and effective multi disciplined teams to represent Australia. This can involve up to seven industrial jurisdictions as well as different employment regimes.

At the outset of UNTAC, the UN asked the Australian Government to consider the deployment of 75 police personnel. In view of the length of time it was expected that the operation would take, and the number of personnel involved, a planning process which provided for state and territory participation along with the AFP, was undertaken. Each of the above issues was addressed and while not formally approached, each Australian jurisdiction positively responded to the request for personnel, subject to the Australian government or the UN meeting all costs associated with the deployment (including the payment of the salaries). A single command and control, common training, and specific conditions of service were also agreed upon.

Ultimately, it was decided that Australia's contribution would be the deployment of 10 personnel which was met by the AFP. In agreeing to this, the government and the UN also met the total cost of the deployment.

In considering future requests, the UN needs to consider financing the deployment of police personnel on a similar basis to that of the military. This would be consistent with the need for such participation to be recognised, and funded, by the international community through the UN.

Command and control arrangements

Police on deployment to UN missions are tasked under the operational control of the military, or an independent Police Commander. Command of the contingent for domestic purposes, that is, discipline and administrative matters, remains with the Contingent Commander.

In UNFICYP, police work under the operational control of the Force Commander (Military). Control arrangements have varied from time to time. At present, members are deployed in small teams in support of sector commanders. Sector commanders request police assistance, and police decide on how to best achieve the task. If police are of the opinion that the task is not a police function, they refer the matter to the Police Superintendent at UN headquarters, who then provides advice to senior command on whether the task should be accepted or not. Although not ideal, this process best maintains the independence of police within this environment.

The situation with police in UNTAC varied from that in Cyprus, where police were under the operational control of a UN Police Commissioner reporting directly to the Secretary-General's Special Representative. The contingent was deployed in a district with the contingent commander also tasked as the police district commander for the area of operations. Police in this situation acted independently of the military, however provided close operational support for military operations in the field relating to civilian matters. In this situation, the district police commander developed a Memorandum of Understanding on police/military co-operation and clear delineation of responsibilities to prevent duplication of effort and waste of resources.

Slightly different arrangements were put in place in the UN operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) where police were formed as a separate component of the mission under the command of a Chief Police Observer, who reported directly to the Special Representative. The component complemented and worked closely with the existing electoral, military, humanitarian and administrative components of UNOMOZ. A strong inter-relationship with other elements of the mission was important in ensuring the success of the police mandate. For police to effectively, and credibly, carry out their mandated verification role, appropriate liaison arrangements needed to be established with the Mozambique National Police at the headquarters in Maputo, at the provincial, district and local (station, post, etc.) levels.

Interoperability with other components

The majority of the UN missions involved in PKOs are comprised of large and diverse components which must effectively cooperate and inter-relate with each other for the appropriate mandates to be fulfilled. As a disciplined police organisation, the AFP has been involved for a considerable time in both long and short-term secondments of its officers to various local, national and international agencies and departments. As a result of this, a considerable pool of expertise has been built up within the organisation of officers capable of operating effectively in isolation and in various multi-command and multi-disciplined organisations. Such expertise is a considered factor when evaluating personnel for selection in AFP UN contingents and allows AFP officers to interface well, and operate effectively, with the other UN military components.

Another considered selection factor for AFP personnel is the identification of officers who have been cross-trained in various police skills. Examples include training in such areas as anti-terrorist/special operations groups; and search and rescue functions. Service in these areas gives officers valuable skills in first aid, communications, hostage negotiation, four wheel driving, bush skills, navigation, high risk situations, and mines and booby trap awareness.

Strategic issues

From a police perspective, there are specific strategic issues which support the involvement of Australian police in PKOs and other international initiatives. Strategically, Australian law enforcement can directly and indirectly benefit from participation in UN PKOs. Direct benefits include:

  • The ability to identify potential criminal threats from countries emerging from peacekeeping operations. There is a growing body of evidence that criminal interests are quick to exploit vulnerable governments and communities. Similarly, countries with immature police and law enforcement systems can unwittingly provide havens for criminal operations.
  • The development of contacts within emerging societies and the reinforcing of the police network and principles.
  • The development of police skills within a community and a heightened awareness of human rights in emerging police organisations. This enables more effective cooperation and mutual assistance to stop the international operation of criminals and criminal groups.

Indirect benefits include personnel development and an increased understanding of the role of police in a free and democratic society.

AFP assessment for participation in PKOs

The AFP assesses its participation in UN missions in accordance with principles for deployment, which are:

  • Clear and achievable goals. AFP experience in UN missions indicates that the most important aspect of UN operations is that they have a clear mandate with realistic and achievable goals.
  • Clear timetable. 34 years of continuous commitment in Cyprus highlights the need for a clear timetable within which to achieve objectives. In contrast, subsequent deployments have achieved outcomes within set time limits.
  • Supportable and sustainable commitment. The AFP assessment is that it could provide and support up to 40 or 50 police personnel (excluding Cyprus) on short term missions.
  • Minimum but effective force to achieve the goals. In accordance with AFP principles of deployment, an assessment of minimum personnel to achieve the goals of the mission is critical to the proposed involvement in missions. Generally, it is preferable that police support be through small but highly skilled units formed specifically for each mission and task. Support is therefore only recommended if the skills of police meet the task requirements of the mission.
  • Acceptable level of risk to police personnel. While police have been deployed to high-risk-level missions in the past, the degree of risk for each mission is assessed to ensure that adequate protection is provided to police. This may be in the form of UN military or local police/military and extends to the provision of body armour.

Therefore, subject to missions satisfactorily meeting the above criteria and funding being provided, the AFP is prepared to positively respond to requests for assistance with UN missions.

In our submissions to government and parliamentary committees, the AFP has noted the growing need for civilian police in UN operations. The objectives established for a police presence in a peacekeeping operation need to include not only the additional patrol, liaison and use of investigative skills, but also to extend to the rebuilding, or building, of a criminal justice infrastructure in a country.

The AFP is well placed from the depth of its skills which have been developed through its overseas liaison role, national and community policing responsibilities, and policing in previous UN missions, to effectively contribute to future PKOs.

Present and previous AFP deployments

United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)

Australian police have been part of UNFICYP since its inception in 1964, when it was established by the UN with a three month mandate to bring an end to hostilities and promote a peaceful solution on the island. Initially, more than 6000 British, Irish, Swedish, Canadian, Austrian and Finnish troops and almost 200 police from Australia, Austria, Denmark, New Zealand and Sweden were deployed to various locations in Cyprus. The initial contingent of 40 police from police services around Australia was deployed in May 1964. It has been a long three months!

An island-wide demarcation line, commonly referred to as the ‘Green Line' or ‘Buffer Zone' now separates the two factions. At its closest point in the capital city of Nicosia, it is several metres wide, and at its furthest, in rural Cyprus, is several kilometres wide.

There are police agencies on both sides of the buffer zone. Turkish Cypriot Police take responsibility for the areas north of the buffer zone, while Cyprus Police, not withstanding their constitutional responsibilities for the whole country, are responsible for the area south of the buffer zone.

Since the commencement of the mission, UNFICYP has changed considerably, with many of the contributing nations either withdrawing or reducing the size of their commitment. The number of peacekeepers at present is approximately 1300. This is dramatically lower than what was initially deployed, but is a slight increase from 1996, following further bi-communal unrest.

The buffer zone is split into three sectors. Sector 1 is the western section of the buffer zone to a point slightly west of Nicosia. Sector 2 incorporates the buffer zone and main check-point at Ledra Palace in Nicosia, with Sector 4 incorporating the buffer zone east of Nicosia and extending to the eastern edge of the country.

The AFP continues to provide 20 personnel on rotation to Cyprus. Although the police commitment has been in place for 34 years, its involvement is continually being assessed in accordance with the renewal of each six month mandate.

Our police role in Cyprus can be likened to community policing without the normal recourse of arrest and presentation of evidence in a court of law. Because of the sensitive political situation, UNFICYP command is reluctant to permit its personnel to appear in a Cypriot court.

The UN does not formally recognise the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus', and therefore cannot recognise the jurisdiction of its courts. Offences which occur in the United Nations Protected Area (UNPA) or the buffer zone are, after initial investigation, usually dealt with administratively or handed over to the police agency responsible for the person involved. So, if a Greek Cypriot was thought to be involved in a criminal offence in the buffer zone, the UN police would investigate the matter, then refer it to the Cyprus police and apply political pressure to resolve it, and in the case of a Turkish Cypriot — vice versa. Where criminal offences are concerned, the peacekeeping role is largely one of liaison and negotiation with local police to obtain a satisfactory solution and ensure a fair outcome. If the matter has implications which could affect the status quo, police investigations must be sufficient to enable UNFICYP command to intervene with confidence.

United Nations Border Relief Operation (UNBRO)

In early 1989, two AFP superintendents were seconded to work with UNBRO in Aranyaprathet, in north-eastern Thailand, to assist the UN and the Thai government to improve security and protection of 300,000 displaced Cambodians located in refugee camps along the Thai-Cambodia border.

The main border camp, site two, was situated 80km from Aranyaprathet and contained 200,000 displaced persons in 7km2. Other camps representing the various factions to the conflict were spread along Thailand's border with Cambodia. Until early 1990, the road to these camps were subjected to guerrilla attacks and movement was limited to armed convoys. In addition, the camps themselves often came under rocket or artillery attack. Initially, a high level of lawlessness existed in the refugee camps resulting in numerous violent crimes.

The breakdown in law and order was addressed with the eventual training of Khmer Police, the establishment of committees of justice and a central jail. This was accomplished with the permission of the government of Thailand and the cooperation of each of the factions.

Achievements of the AFP members with UNBRO include: establishing, training and equipping a 1267 strong police force of Cambodia refugees; convincing competing political parties or influential groups to support the police; establishing a traditional Cambodian court system; establishing a prison system; and writing a criminal code and regulations for the police, the court and the prisons.

United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)

In May 1992, 10 AFP members were deployed to Phnom Penh to participate within the peacekeeping force. On arrival, the contingent was briefed and deployed to Banteay Meanchey Province, an area which was described as the liberated zone, that is, under shared command of Cambodia factions including the Khmer Rouge.

The UN forces in the area were, accordingly, responsible directly to UNTAC (including to the police commissioner) in Phnom Penh. The contingent was deployed with an attachment of five German border police and six Tunisian police who were placed under the command of the AFP superintendent. The group was later increased by the attachment of eight Indian and eight French police who had previously been deployed to another location.

The patrol area of the group extended to the Thailand border, adjacent to the refugee camps where the UN Border Relief Operation (UNBRO) had forged good relations with Khmer camp police. The patrol area took in approximately 2500km2. The contingent was briefed to: establish a UN police presence in the area; investigate human rights violations and report on such to UN command (during the period July 1, 1992 to August 15, 1993, about 205 cases, involving the death or injury of 355 people were investigated by contingent members); bring about an environment of calm and confidence conducive to the holding of free elections, planned for May 1993; control and supervise the factionalised local police; and provide training and development for local police within their area of responsibility. (The AFP trained 438 police, including 12 police women from all factions. This represented 42.9 per cent of the total police personnel in the Thmar Pouk district).

UNTAC was the first UN operation that included large numbers of police. Some 3600 police from 45 countries contributed to the work of UNTAC. The questionable quality of training, skills and preparedness of a number of contingents led to criticism being levelled against police in Cambodia, and indeed to the UN establishing a more rigid selection criteria for police personnel. While the police were deployed throughout Cambodia and were briefed generally on what their role was to be, they were not given specific objectives or targets, nor initially supported properly from a logistics perspective.

The first contingent was replaced by a further 10 AFP members in February 1993. In addition to this commitment, police fingerprint experts from NSW, Victoria and Queensland were also deployed to assist with supervision of the elections.

United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II)

In May 1993, one superintendent was seconded to UNOSOM II to the post of senior police adviser to the special representative of the secretary general. The task was to provide advice on the need for police monitors, and where possible, organise the development and training of a civilian police authority in Somalia.

In November 1993, a second superintendent was appointed as the director of police services and deputy director of justice in Somalia. The task of the director was to control and direct UN police to assist in the re-establishment of the Somali Police at local and regional levels in order to restore peace, stability and law and order. Unfortunately, staff were not provided to assist in this role and the mission struggled to achieve its objectives. At a late stage of the mission police trainers were provided by various contributing countries, but it was a case of too little too late. It was unrealistic to provide civilian police while at the same time withdrawing military personnel.

United Nations Mission in Mozambique (UNOMOZ)

Following the Rome Agreement, the UN security council established the UN Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ), with a mandate to verify the demobilisation and disarmament of forces and the withdrawal of foreign troops, to assist and monitor the organisation of elections and to coordinate humanitarian assistance. Part of UNOMOZ was to be made up of civilian police. The security council authorised a police component of 1144 personnel on February 23, 1994.

The mandate of the UNOMOZ police component (CIVPOL) was:

  • To monitor all police activities in the country, including those of the Mozambique National Police and any other police and security agencies and verify that their actions were fully consistent with the general peace agreement.
  • To monitor the respect of rights and liberties of Mozambican citizens throughout the country.
  • To provide technical support to the National Police Commission.
  • To verify that the activities of private protection and security agencies do not violate the general peace agreement.
  • To verify the strength and location of the government police forces, their material, as well as any other information which might be needed in support of the peace process.
  • To monitor and verify the process of the reorganisation and retraining of the ‘quick reaction police' and their activities, as well as to verify their weapons and equipment.
  • To monitor, together with other UNOMOZ components, the proper conduct of the electoral campaign and verify that political rights of individuals, groups and political organisations are respected in accordance with the general peace agreement and relevant electoral documents.

The AFP committed a 16-member contingent for deployment to Mozambique. They were dispersed across the country in areas ranging from headquarters to police posts, undertaking tasks ranging from regional and provincial commanders, to investigations and operations officers. The contingent was withdrawn in December 1994.

Multinational Force to Haiti

The Australian government was requested by the US to support them in their tasking to restore democracy in Haiti. The AFP supported the multi-national force with 30 members comprising both male and female members from the AFP, Victoria Police and Queensland Police Service.

The contingent was deployed in November 1994 to a small coastal village called Jeramie and returned at the mission's end in March 1995.

The broad mission statement for the international police monitors was to monitor and mentor the Interim Police Security Force (IPSF) which continued until midday of March 14, 1995 when the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) police personnel took over authority and responsibility.

Confidence was restored within the community of the region, so that they were able to report matters without fear of retribution from the IPSF.

Truce Monitoring Group — Bougainville

Following peace talks in Burnham, New Zealand in October 1997, four AFP members were deployed to Bougainville as part of the Truce Monitoring Group. The role of monitors was to observe and monitor; investigate any breach; liaise; facilitate the peace process; discourage any potential breach of the truce; and report any breach of the truce.

The TMG concluded at midnight on April 30 and was replaced with a Peace Monitoring Group (PMG). The AFP maintains two police monitors in Bougainville. The role of the PMG incorporates: recording, locating and arranging disposal of all arms, ammunition and explosives and other such material; to monitor and report on compliance of parties to the ceasefire; to promote and instil confidence in the peace process; to provide information to Bougainvilleans about the peace process/ceasefire; to provide such assistance in restoration and development consistent with the Lincoln Agreement as the parties may agree; to assist with the development and training and institution of a Bougainvillean constabulary; and to assist with other matters as may be agreed by the other parties which will assist with the democratic resolution of the conflict.

Principal functions of modern peacekeeping

The long term success of a peacekeeping operation will be judged by the length of time peace can be sustained, regardless of whether mission objectives were achieved. In time, the significance of achieving mandate goals will blur, if the rule of law collapses again. Analysis of the problem and planning for the future are considered essential elements for longer term peace.

The utilisation of professional police, who maintain peace on a daily basis within their home jurisdictions, can only add value to the process of peacekeeping. I consider it apt to conclude with, and commend, six principal functions of a modern police service, which are considered appropriate within the context of contemporary, international peacekeeping:

  • Maintain the public peace.
  • Uphold the rule of law and due process.
  • Protect and provide assistance to all citizens.
  • Facilitate the democratic rights and freedoms of all citizens.
  • Reduce the fear of crime and disorder.;
  • Cooperate with others to ensure a just, stable and orderly society.