Enhancing AFP Counter Terrorism International and National Roles
Speech by National Manager Counter Terrorism Ben McDevitt
Tuesday 12 July 2005
Safeguarding Australia Summit 2005
Convention Centre, Canberra
Thank you for the opportunity to present to you today - amongst many distinguished speakers and audience members - on a theme that is THE highest priority for the community and for the Australian governments and their agencies - SAFEGUARDING AUSTRALIA.
Firstly, I would like to summarise the underlying context of my speech by reflecting on the words of Abraham Lincoln, "The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew".
Policing and the environment we operate in have evolved rapidly - particularly since September 11. There was a time where our focus in policing was only within Australia and the issues that we faced revolved around operational and legislative constraints in crossing State and Territory borders.
Today, policing has transcended Australia's borders to correspond with the transnational nature of the crimes we investigate. Our threats and therefore our challenges are not Australia-bound nor are they domestically derived - they now largely emanate from overseas, are internationally driven and globally impressed.
We have a collective responsibility to adapt, and adapt promptly, to the environment as it changes around us. It would be illogical for policing, governance, practices and procedures to remain the same when everything around us is all so different.
Our frameworks must adapt and correspond with the crime. However, when gaps and constraints are realised any variations should strike a critical balance between civil liberties and operational needs.
This requires us to understand our environment, contextualise the current challenges, pre-empt future events and trends AND respond appropriately and wisely.
This brings me to explain policing as we know it today and the consequential issues and sensitivities we are currently managing. These issues and sensitivities should be used to influence how we should change; how we should shape and strengthen national consensus on appropriate responses to terrorism and other transnational crime; how we should strengthen regional partnerships; and how we develop and implement government policies. Ultimately, our ability to do this now will dictate how and where our future lies.
It has become evident over the last four or so years that to be effective in countering terrorism, and in operationalising the sentiments of policies and memoranda of understanding, we must take the fight to the source, that is, offshore.
Enhancing the skills of our neighbouring partner agencies increases regional capabilities to disable and disrupt terrorists who are training, proselytising, recruiting and planning terrorist acts. The net result of us investing significant resources into the region is a mitigation of the threat of terrorism penetrating our borders.
The AFP response to terrorism is best explained by plotting our activity along two key variables:
1. Whether the location of the investigation is domestic or offshore; and
2. Whether the investigation is proactive or reactive
When plotted on a matrix you can see that the counter terrorism environment requires a multi-faceted approach incorporating a range of domestic and international measures to mitigate the threat of terrorism in Australia and more broadly, the region. This is the AFP's strategy.
By way of representation, the Y axis is bounded at the opposite ends by the internal and external environments in which we work - or the domestic versus the international.
The X axis charts our proactive and reactive responses in the counter terrorism environment and provides the continuum on which we plot all our responses ranging from counter-terrorism policy initiatives to post-event responses.
Anything that appears on the right side of the Y axis generally indicates action taken post an 'event' (not necessarily an attack but a terrorist-related activity) at a domestic or international level.
Anything plotted on the left side of the axis represents work being undertaken to prevent terrorist incidents, both domestically and abroad.
So, in essence, we have
- internal/proactive responses;
- internal reactive responses;
- external/proactive strategies; and
- external reactive responses.
The north-eastern quadrant - the internal/reactive environment - includes AFP operations such as the investigations involving Jack Roche.
Roche was the first Australian to be convicted of terrorism-related offences in relation to plans to bomb the Israeli Embassy in Canberra. In June last year, he was sentenced to 9 years jail. Evidence from Roche has assisted Australian authorities to understand Jemaah Islamiah in the region, particularly Australia and has also been used to support the Abu Bakir Bashir prosecution in Indonesia.
The internal/proactive quadrant includes everything that we are doing proactively - training exercises, regulation of passports and aviation security, identity crime and terrorism financing measures as well as the investigation of all Australian linkages to overseas terrorist activity.
Importantly though is that everything we do offshore is really a proactive response to domestic terrorism. The reason is that on of our objectives in going overseas is to enhance our skills and our knowledge so that we can be better at investigating terrorism in Australia and be better prepared. This is in addition to enhancing the skills of our partner agencies to disrupt terrorism at the earliest phases and before it penetrates our borders.
This brings me to the focus of my speech - that is, international counter terrorism strategies which lay in the south western external/proactive response quadrant and the south-eastern external/reactive environment.
- The unprecedented response to the Bali bombings in October 2002, which resulted in the deaths of 88 Australians was the first of many significant bombings that the AFP provided assistance to. Critically, this deployment resulted in the establishment of an ongoing cooperative presence in Indonesia.
- Bombings in Davao (Airport and Ferry Terminal) and Korondal City Markets in the Southern Philippines during 2003 reinforced the international terrorist threat posed to our region. While no Australians were killed, the AFP recognised the uncertain environment that these bombings created in our region and offered assistance.
- Riyadh - Saudi Arabia in May 2003, suicide bombers attack three Riyadh compounds housing foreigners, killing 35 people including at least nine bombers. One Australian ex-pat was killed.
- August 5 - 2003. A bomb exploded outside the JW Marriott hotel in central Jakarta. The Marriot - one of the best known, most prestigious western hotels in Jakarta had its front gutted by an explosion of similar design to that which rocked Bali. The AFP immediately deployed a team of specialists to supplement the team we already had working with the INP.
- November 2003 - Istanbul, Turkey. A truck laden with explosives rolled through the front gates of the British consulate. This resulted in the fourth explosion as part of a well-synchronised suicide bombing attack. 4 explosions, 4 vehicle bombs, 4 locations.
The fatalities included one Australian female and long-term resident of Turkey and employee of the British Consulate. She died instantly in an office not far from the seat of the explosion.
Establishing the time, and circumstances of an Australian death after a terrorist attack will always be a priority.
- October 2004 - the AFP provided assistance to the Philippines in investigating the Superferry bombing which occurred in February 2004, soon followed by assistance to the Philippine National Police to the December meat market bombings.
- Our response to these bombings resulted in the formation of a joint agreement for the AFP to provide ongoing assistance in responding to, and preventing terrorism in the Philippines. This agreement, underscored by a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding enabled the AFP to provide IMMEDIATE assistance on 14 February 2005 in response to multiple bombings, known as the "Valentines Day bombings".
- We also provided assistance in March 2004 to the Madrid train bombings. 13 Improvised Explosive Devices in 13 backpacks. Ten detonated on the trains, three others rendered safe by Spanish authorities.
200 people died as a result of the attack and over 1800 were injured.
- Some time later, in May 2004 we again found ourselves deploying to Saudi Arabia. This time in the northern town of Yanbu where an Australian engineer was killed when militants attacked the company he worked for.
- One of the most recent of responses - the Australian Embassy bombing, Jakarta - September 9, 2004.
Many of those employed by the Embassy bore the brunt of the blast - miraculously most survived.
Again, thanks largely to our Indonesian colleagues we can say with confidence that those responsible for the Embassy bombing were also involved in the Marriott and Bali attacks. The AFP commends the Indonesian National Police, and Indonesian authorities generally for the commitment to countering terrorism, their hospitality and support of AFP officers in their country and their efforts and successes in investigating terrorism committed in Indonesia and prosecuting and incarcerating those responsible for those atrocities.
As we speak, the investigation into the Bali, Marriott and Embassy bombings continue - as does the pursuit by Indonesian authorities for those responsible. The AFP is committed to working alongside the Indonesian National Police in a range of capacities and disciplines in order to enhance the investigation.
The recent London bombings are a reminder that terrorism still poses a threat and that no country can consider itself immune.
The AFP leads a small team comprising forensics, bomb data and investigative specialists deployed last Friday to support the UK authorities in responding to this atrocity. The team comprises a member from Victoria and New South Wales police and the Department of Transport and Regional Service - reflective of the multi-agency and multi-jurisdiction elements required to approach this crime. This team supplements the cooperative efforts already undertaken by our AFP Liaison Officers based in London, including a dedicated Australian Federal Police counter terrorism liaison officer. A dedicated counter terrorism Liaison Officer has been based in London for almost 2 years now.
Our deployment to cooperate with the UK authorities on this occasion echoes the strong and effective relationship we have. We share the view that there are multiple benefits in working together in response to bombings for the purpose of learning from such incidents.
The UK authorities accompanied the AFP in assisting the Indonesian authorities respond to the Bali bombings. This cooperative relationship continued for up to 7 months post the incident with 2 UK Met Police seconded to the AFP. The exposure to the Bali bombings and the skills acquired in, and lessons learnt from, responding to such an attack are then transferable to the domestic arena in responding and for training.
The exposure to the Bali bombings would have benefited the UK Met for the investigation and response to the London bombings. Equally, the AFP will again learn a lot by deploying and working alongside our UK colleagues. This supplements all the lessons learnt in deploying to all the bombings mentioned earlier.
We must support each others' endeavours to locate and prosecute terrorist activity wherever it occurs.
Assistant Commissioner Peter Drennan who leads the team of 6 has contacted me a number of times since the team arrived in London over the weekend. What has been made evident to us over there and through the media is that UK authorities are ahead of the pack when it comes to responding to terrorist attacks. The high-level professionalism and systematic and comprehensive measures they have employed during this response have been nothing short of impressive.
So why are we in London? Because our Australian counter terrorism strategy has the 3 elements of preparedness, prevention and response and we can learn about all 3 of those elements trough the British experience. We can also offer our own experience and knowledge. We are certain to learn a lot by working with the UK authorities on this occasion.
Of course those deployments mentioned today are not the only deployments in which we have been involved. There have been others where the focus has been different - contingency planning, hostage taking, the tsunami disaster and alike. All of these add to the rich fabric of experience and capability that is being developed to firstly mitigate the threat or terrorism against Australia and its interests, but also develop our skills and enhance the capacity of both ourselves and our regional partners.
Benefits in deploying our officers offshore are mutual. These officers come back with a wealth of experience and provide enormous value to the AFP and policing this crime in Australia - thanks to the generosity of our overseas law enforcement colleagues and the depth of experience, skills and knowledge they impart on our officers.
These skills then become transferable for use during domestic investigations, enabling the AFP to effectively coordinate and lead Australian efforts in combating and responding to a terrorist attack - if it were to occur on Australian shores.
As rapidly as crime and its transnational features have evolved, and as rapidly as we have equipped ourselves to respond to, and combat it - through training, cooperation, collaboration, legislative powers and technological capabilities - the challenges have equally enveloped our progression. These challenges are threefold - firstly operational, secondly - political, and thirdly legislative.
Operational challenges
Reducing the ability of terrorist groups and disrupting their activities is at the heart of AFP counter terrorism operational policy. It is the principal focus of our cooperation and collaboration efforts offshore.
But with this focus comes limitations. One proven limitation is the fact that mass casualties can be inflicted through use of minimal resources. The Oklahoma City bombing demonstrated that two men, one truck and home-made fertilizer explosives combined with ill-intent can result in a terrorist act with serious consequences.
Conversely, terrorist groups can deploy the same criminal enterprises and sophisticated methodologies as any other crime syndicate. Transnational terrorist groups such as Al-Qaida and Jemaah Islamiah are too well-entrenched and widespread to wipe out with a few well-conceived counter terrorism operations and short-term strategies.
Additionally, advances in technology and awareness of law enforcement practices and procedures, fuel changes in terrorist methodology that aim to frustrate law enforcement efforts.
For example: use of multiple telecommunications services, encrypted messages and evolving capabilities with increasingly sophisticated technology that constantly challenge the currency and scope of law enforcement tools of investigation and associated powers; use of multiple identities to facilitate the commission of terrorism and associated crimes, etc.
What we are also finding is that terrorist organisations are increasingly transient with their membership and support networks spread across the world. Terrorist organisations also rely on close cohesion, mutual trust and the code of silence and have intimate knowledge of weaknesses in the law.
All of these challenges combined, makes the job of policing this crime a very difficult one. And this is a job often compounded by constraints caused by the jurisdictional boundaries in which we have to operate, the consequential limitations, and the varying processes and standards that apply and that must be respected.
Accordingly, integration and co-location of law enforcement agencies like our cooperation teams in Indonesia and the Philippines are now absolutely fundamental to combating terrorism and other serious crimes in the region. There is no sense to law enforcement agencies working in silos and working independently from each other. This would be duplicative in terms of resources and energy and it would result in information gaps, skills shortages and lack of cohesion in terms of strategy, tactics and information gathering and analysis.
It is not an objective or even a considered possibility to fight terrorism and its causes unilaterally - not by us, not by any law enforcement agency. Fighting terrorism requires multi-lateral approaches in our thinking, in our policing, in our information sharing and in our strategies.
This philosophy is central to the AFP's principles of cooperation and assistance to all counterparts worldwide. And the AFP, for this reason, will be prepared to develop the same type of cooperation teams as those formed in the Philippines and Indonesia with any regional counterpart if invited to.
Our underlying rationale for deploying overseas is not to impose our legal system, our policing practices, our beliefs and values - it is purely to strengthen the region and our collective ability to address the root causes of terrorism, therefore minimising any prospect of our neighbours becoming vulnerable to hosting terrorists in their State.
Collaboration also creates centralised and improved information holdings in the region, minimises information gaps, and ensures agencies better understand each other so that we are not working at cross-purposes and so we may share the same vision and goals.
The investigative and technical skills we use and enhance everyday offshore enhance our skills for investigating and detecting terrorist activity back in Australia. Our cooperative efforts result in better relations in our region based on trust, confidence and understanding.
Political dimensions
Crime syndicates - be it drug smugglers, people traffickers or terrorists - have transcended our borders. We cannot pick and choose times and venues for the sharing of information for the enforcement of the law in hope that the end result will end up on our shores for us to take appropriate action. We cannot say to our partner agencies "we will assist on this occasion because it benefits us, but we are not in a position to assist you on the next occasion because it isn't in our best interests, despite it being in yours".
Similarly, we cannot say "we will work with you to defeat the threat of terrorism but not the scourge of drugs.
We have to be flexible at all phases of the investigation, share information to all our partner agencies and have multiple contingency plans for any possible scenario that may unfold during the commission of any crime. And this is far from easy - there are very few investigations where the crime has been committed to any script we have pre-empted at any stage of the investigation.
Crime is extremely complex and global. Criminals, including terrorists no longer operate in one jurisdiction - they frequently cross borders with the intent of exploiting our weaknesses. One of those identified weaknesses is that police are constrained by jurisdictional boundaries.
And this is only reasonable - we don't want to be imposing our systems on a neighbouring country - any more than we would want them to impose theirs on us. Australians would not tolerate another country telling us how our legal system should deal with criminals, what penalties we should impose on those that contravene our laws.
So how do we work around it?
While constitutions and national sovereignty preclude us from operating beyond our jurisdiction, they do not preclude us from cooperating beyond our domestic borders. On this point, the AFP goes nowhere without invitation and does not operate unilaterally any other country.
Global support and cooperation are essential for enhancing capacity to proactively investigate terrorism, supporters of terrorism and the financing of terrorism and to mitigate the chance of attack. This entails a collective willingness amongst us to share strategic and tactical intelligence; and demonstrate a willingness to aid the attack on terrorism regardless of where final outcomes - seizures & arrests - are made.
Training and operating together are also essential ingredients, enabling us to better understand each other, to be better at investigating and tracking crime and to form a shared vision, albeit with different underscoring frameworks.
In that respect the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation is a critical platform for achieving these objectives. The JCLEC is symbolic of the strength of regional partnerships in combating transnational crime in the region. It also illustrates our collective commitment to collaborate in the fight against transnational organised crime, especially terrorism.
The ultimate outcome that can be achieved by working together and by sharing our information at the earliest possible stage is that Australia is kept safe, in fact, that the region is kept safe.
And the safety of our region is a priority for Australia.
Inevitably, our future will largely be determined by the success and speed of our adjustment to the region in which we are situated.
The most critical to performing our role successfully - which depends on our offshore engagement - is respecting the sovereignty of all nations.
While we are a major contributor in terms of assistance and cooperation, we need to watch that accusations of "Big Brother" do not gain momentum. We must ensure that we act in an understanding, helpful and consultative manner, not in a demanding, patronising or over-assertive way if we wish to avoid tensions that large powers can provoke.
In increasing our offshore engagement and despite that engagement representing cooperation and partnership, it is imperative that we regularly pose that critical question - how do our neighbours and other foreign counterparts see us?
Legislative constraints
With increased offshore cooperation there is an increased prospect that disparate legislative regimes invoking differing evidentiary and investigative requirements will create impediments with prosecuting those responsible for terrorist crimes. This is exacerbated in the case of terrorism because we will always rely on each other for evidence, witnesses and information generally as we continue to chase and convict those responsible for terrorist acts.
Our job is to police crime without fear or favour. And as part of that process, I consider that we would not be doing our job properly if we left any stone unturned - whether that stone is in this jurisdiction or a jurisdiction from which an element of the crime is committed but is governed by the laws of our partners.
And the nature of terrorism means that its connections and consequences WILL almost always cross jurisdictional boundaries - State, Territory and Commonwealth.
Awareness of the evidentiary regimes across key regional countries and an ability to understand these differences and reflect this understanding and a certain degree of tolerance in our own frameworks for the greater goal of eradicating - or at least minimising - terrorism is critical to overcoming potential problems associated with future terrorism prosecutions.
While investigations into terrorist activity have brought a new set of demands upon the legislature, they have also brought new challenges to the agencies charged with carrying out public expectations.
Beyond the jurisdictional issues and boundaries are the pressures on law enforcement being able to effectively and accurately action intelligence.
In respect of gathering criminal intelligence, not only are we expected to anticipate the next move, but we also have to do something about bringing those involved to justice. While there are fundamental differences in purposes between intelligence that aims to warn and prevent - and - information gathered for criminal investigation, each purpose relies on both intelligence and information.
The difficulty posed is achieving seamless transition from criminal and strategic intelligence to information in an admissible form for use in criminal investigations and prosecutions. And this step is critical if we are to successfully identify and prosecute those responsible for terrorist attacks or threats of terrorism in our region and attaining our holistic goal of minimising the threat of terrorism.
Cooperation and understanding between law enforcement and intelligence agencies worldwide is now at an unprecedented but necessary level. Forging of relationships has necessitated enhancing understanding and interoperability between our own agencies and our different functional purposes as well our day-to-day practices and procedures.
Conclusion
The AFP is committed to continuing our strong relationships, particularly within the region, with law enforcement partners on terrorism.
Through training, capacity building, and operational cooperation the AFP will build upon the work already done and search for new and innovative ways to increase the operational efficiencies of all agencies - ourselves included.
And let's not be mistaken. The knowledge, skills and capability we can deliver to our partners is more than matched in the experience, skills and knowledge that we in turn receive from them.
Cooperation is the key.
The AFP is committed to contributing to our regional endeavours to eradicate terrorism, enhance our policing capacity and minimise opportunities for terrorists to exploit our gaps.
As the threat to Australian interests offshore will continue to expand, so too will the AFP's offer of support, collaboration and cooperation to disrupt terrorist activity at the earliest possible stages. And this necessitates an understanding of the difference between our governance and frameworks, demonstrating a willingness to work within the different regimes and fundamentally respecting the sovereignty of all nations and their political and legislative frameworks.
Our success cannot be simply measured by the prevention of one attack, or the arrest of one terrorist. Our success is far from being realised and will only truly be achieved in eradicating extremist ideologies and incarcerating those intent on challenging the security of our region.
In this regard, cooperation and collaboration with our regional counterparts will be the critical component of long-term success - for all regional law enforcement strategies - from preventative action to reactive response. Measuring our success incorporates reviewing our ability to improve our relationships, our partnerships and our collegiate approaches as well as our ability to adapt to the regional and criminal environments that dictate our future.
The transnational and rapidly evolving terrorism environment necessitates strategic and global thinking by all of us - governments, departments, agencies, corporations and individuals.
The AFP experience is that governments and their agencies can be versatile and can adopt varying forms of policing and whole-of-government measures to meet the challenges before us. Maintaining this momentum and expanding on achievements is critical to mitigating the threat of terrorism and continuing to safeguard Australia, its people and its interests.
Questions?