Counter Terrorism Challenges in Australia
Speech by Australian Federal Police Commissioner Mick Keelty APM
AFR Counter Terrorism Summit 2006, Melbourne
24 October 2006
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I would like to begin by acknowledging the Traditional owners - the Kulin people and thank their elders past and present for the connections with this land.
It is a pleasure to be with you here today and to see the business community actively engaged in the business of security by staging this important summit.
If Australia is to effectively counter terrorism, a community-wide response is essential. It is not the sole responsibility of law enforcement or Government given the private sector owns or operates up to 90 per cent of Australia’s infrastructure, business has a key role to play and therefore needs to understand the challenges and work with us.
My topic today is ‘counter terrorism challenges in Australia’
Although much has been achieved on the counter terrorism and national security fronts over recent years, it is an evolving phenomenon that requires evolving responses.
To date we have forged strong international partnerships, introduced new anti-terrorism laws, learnt much about terrorist mindsets and methodologies, and made significant inroads in identifying and dismantling terrorist groups in our region.
But, as each new terrorism incident unfolds around the world, we are reminded of the need to be continually monitoring many environments and learning more about the complexities underpinning these events.
Although no attack has occurred on Australian soil, we are constantly reminded that Australia remains a target. Just last week in its annual report, ASIO reiterated that “Islamic extremists see Australian interests around the world and Australia itself as targets for terrorist attacks.”
As one of the lead agencies involved in countering terrorism in Australia, the AFP faces many challenges in this regard.
Operational challenges
The challenge of prevention:
One of the major challenges presented to us by terrorism is the need to take law enforcement action much earlier than we might in other forms of crime as the stakes are much higher. Working in this ‘preventative’ space requires a different form of policing and operating than was traditionally the case.
There is the need for balance -if we intervene too early, we may not have sufficient evidence to support criminal charges. If we intervene too late, the consequences could be quite catastrophic.
And you only have to think about the London bombings last year in July; not only the 7th July but, more importantly to me, the 21st July – the attempted bombings, because that’s where we saw a group of people try and emulate, almost perfectly what had happened on the 7th July and you know there’s no connection between the two.
The 7th July bombings on the three underground railways and the fourth on the double decker bus was actually a copy on the 21st July or attempted to be copied but the people on the 21st July didn’t realise the only reason the double decker bus was blown up was because the Northern train line was shut for maintenance and that particular suicide bomber diverted from the train to the bus.
In Lee’s introduction, he mentioned the foiled Heathrow attacks. What would be talking about today if those planes had come out of the sky? The fact the police acted early and prevented that crime from happening is a great thing but just imagine our reactions if those planes had come out of the sky or if indeed there’d been a second attack.
I think one of the things we have to be cogniscent of when we are studying and being students of this, is not to be overwhelmed by what’s happening in the media, and actually take time to stop and think about what is happening such as the 21 July attempted bombings. Where would be today? Would there be any air travel around the world if those planes had come out of the sky?
I think the challenge of evolving terrorist methodologies is also a focus. They are now using softer targets. We have also seen terrorists exploiting new and emerging technologies to fund and facilitate terrorist activities. They use mobile phones and remote control devices to detonate bombs. We’ve seen new bombs and bomb making materials such as liquids being formed or being joined to make bombs.
We have rapidly changing environments to recruit new terrorists, and terrorist organisational strategies are put in place to counter what we’re doing on our side. We’ve seen examples of networks behind charities and legitimate business enterprises. We’ve also seen disturbing evidence of home grown terrorists with no known criminal backgrounds and how do you then counter that movement and embracing of an idea?
There are many examples - the hostage taking in Beslan; the detonation of improvised explosive devices that occur with tragic regularity in places like Afghanistan, Iraq and Sri Lanka and the Sarin gas attack that occurred years ago in the Japan underground train system. It is clear the imperative must be to prevent such acts from occurring at all.
These factors make the job of policing terrorism very difficult.
As Colonel Petrus Golose, of Indonesia’s anti-terrorist taskforce recently said, “Now they recruit people who understand technology - this is technology-based crime."
As well as offering a host of opportunities for communications, money laundering and financing of terrorist activities, the online environment also provides capacity for large-scale disruption. This includes the use of Botnet armies and denial of service attacks, which can effectively shut down websites and legitimate service provision.
In addition, malicious code can illegally strip data and assets held on computers. As much of business and government rely on online service delivery, such attacks present real risks.
For police, this is an environment that is difficult to police given its jurisdictional and technical dimensions.
Identity crime is also being increasingly embraced by terrorists as an enabling crime. For example, in the lead up to the September 11, Bali and Madrid attacks, false and altered identity documents were used to enter targeted countries, and were financed through card skimming and ATM fraud. In the case of September 11, the 19 hijackers used 364 false names and two were trained in passport alteration by Al Qaeda.
Similarly in Bali, the bombers used false person or company identities to import goods, lease vehicles and storage units, obtain mobile telephones and rent the house in Bali utilised by the bombing team.
Identity crime has been estimated to cost Australia anywhere between $1 billion and $4 billion annually. Worldwide the cost has been put as high as $2 trillion.
And of course, traditional forms of crime - such as fraud, property crime, illicit drug trafficking and people smuggling - are also used to fund and facilitate terrorist activities.
Another area not often thought about in detail is how fragile and susceptible nation-states can quickly become breeding grounds for crime and terrorist activity, which then undermines the security of our region. These threats need to be addressed in the interests of Australia’s long-term national security.
Working offshore in so-called ‘imperfectly governed democracies’ however, is presenting major challenges. Police are forced to deal with corruption and poor governance when carrying out their daily work and this is demoralising and disheartening
The actions of police are frequently interpreted by some as political interference, when they are just doing their job and upholding the criminal justice system. This sort of tension is hampering progress and ultimately undermining security in the region.
Police are facing resourcing challenges; finding the right people to undertake all the tasks necessary in countering terrorism and strengthening national security remains an ongoing challenge. At present, personnel are required to fill new positions in intelligence, aviation security and expansion of the International Deployment Group Shortage
Legislative and political challenges
To effectively police a crime such as terrorism, it is imperative that law enforcement efforts are supported by a criminal justice system that is adequate and robust for dealing with such a complex group of crimes.
As such we needed and sought legislation that allowed earlier intervention in terrorism investigations and since 2001 there has been significant legislative change. In particular, the Australian Government has enacted specific criminal offences dealing with the preparation and planning of terrorist activities, training with terrorist organisations, and being a member of, or financing terrorist organisations.
It has also amended existing law enforcement powers to broaden the use of telecommunications interception and electronic surveillance devices, and to provide, in appropriate circumstances and with proper oversight, extended time periods for the questioning of suspected terrorists in police custody.
But challenges remain.
Because terrorism is inherently political it brings with it a dimension to criminal proceedings that would not normally be the case. The challenge for law enforcement is to maintain the apolitical character of policing, while at the same time dealing with the issues at hand.
The AFP has had to ensure it acts according to the law and with impartiality. Because the issues are so inextricably linked to politics and political positions, we have to make sure we don’t become overwhelmed by that or succumb to the temptation to try and act in a political way. It seems there will always be the temptation for some commentators to try and view the actions of the AFP to be politically motivated or driven.
But if the definition of terrorism is to actually commit an act or threaten to commit an act that alters the position of a government or a particular policy position of government, then it is inherently political and that is part of the criminal justice system that really hasn’t been extended yet.
Another of the primary challenges relates to the sharing of information and intelligence with our partners.
Counter-terrorism investigations will draw on intelligence about individuals and groups which may have been gathered over many years; the sheer volume of information can be overwhelming and requires significant resources and technology. Ensuring we do not miss what could be the vital piece of information is but one challenge.
Another is the increasing need for swift exchange of intelligence between the agencies engaged in combating terrorism. If we are to be effective, we must be able to quickly and easily share information and intelligence with our partners, both locally and internationally. But the need to share this material must be balanced with the equally important need to appropriately protect it.
An important point to note is that intelligence collected for national security purposes does not amount to admissible evidence. The methodologies adopted by intelligence agencies are very different to those adopted by police, and there are good reasons for this. In simple terms, the objective of an intelligence operation is knowledge and understanding; the objective of a police investigation is arrest and prosecution. Evidence is tested in courts - intelligence is not.
We remain concerned about the possible need to intervene when there simply is not enough evidence to support a criminal charge of even planning or conspiring to commit an act of terrorism but, where we are still sufficiently concerned about the need to take action in order to protect the community.
In 2005, the Council of Australian Governments agreed to the introduction of two new types of law enforcement interventions namely, control orders and preventative detention orders.
Control orders go beyond traditional law enforcement measures of arrest and charge. This new measure allows the AFP to seek a control order to address concerns about behaviour and threats to community safety.
Preventative detention orders are important tools that can both defuse the imminent threat of an attack, and allow time for further investigations to be carried out and evidence obtained.
As you’ll see in some of the images in front of you, the Bali crime scene was spread over something like five square kilometres, with 46 separate crime scenes within that radius and about 3500 individual exhibits. One of the first things you want to do is to establish the cause of the bombing; Was it chemical? How was it detonated? Are there more bombs out there?
The Australian Government is not alone in keeping its counter-terrorism legislative framework under review.
Following the attacks in London in 2005, the UK Parliament increased its preventative detention regime from 14 days to 28 days. These powers are currently being used in relation to the investigation into the alleged plot to attack aircraft leaving Heathrow airport. These are important developments. But many of the provisions are yet to be tested and, like any new police power, we expect their use will be challenged.
As such, these matters are out of our hands and will be determined by courts. Any future action in relation to amending or introducing legislation to further bolster our efforts in countering terrorism will undoubtedly continue to involve close consultation between our governments and relevant departments and agencies.
Limitations associated with obtaining evidence transnationally
There are many problems associated with collecting evidence internationally due to different standards and priorities among criminal justice systems and Australia cannot force its standards on foreign countries. Evidence obtained overseas however, can be ruled inadmissible in court cases here at home when standards are inferior, but we will use the courts to prove our case, not the media.
There are physical and procedural limitations to collecting information and evidence and by its very nature, intelligence tends to be one of those commodities that agencies hold close. Not only are there cultural and organisational barriers to be overcome, even the practicalities of sharing can often be quite difficult.
Issues such as obtaining secure means for transferring information and intelligence, ensuring that data is safeguarded once it reaches its final location, and even recognition and understanding of the various classifications and caveats placed on information, can pose challenges to timely exchanges of intelligence.
ARHCIWG
To overcome such situations, one initiative is the annual Asia Region Heads of Criminal Intelligence Working Group—otherwise known as the ARHCIWG where members; conduct joint strategic intelligence projects; share training opportunities; develop agreed intelligence definitions, processes and procedures and establish protocols to identify new or emerging crime trends of significance to the region.
The next ARHCIWG meeting is scheduled for November this year in Shanghai, and will be co-hosted by the Chinese Ministry of Public Security. It will provide a valuable platform for all member agencies to pool experience, knowledge, and to exchange intelligence in the lead-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics. This is where we will hear more about the Mumbi bombings, and progress in the investigation across Pakistan, US and UK in terms of the thwarted attack against the airlines industry.
A current AFP project that will support and build on the work of the ARHCIWG is the creation of a web-based forum to enable sharing of information between the AFP and those agencies which adopt the system. Although this platform will not be able to support the exchange of highly classified information, it will provide a valuable link for the sharing of opportunities and events of interest and ensuring that the lines of communication between intelligence staff in the region are kept open.
Partnerships are critical to national security strategies
From an AFP perspective, we have initiated and established partnerships at local, national and international levels, and across a range of industries including business and academia, one being a partnership with Flinders University and the University of Queensland to evaluate the AFP’s performance in areas ranging from counter-terrorism to protection and regional assistance.
While Australia has yet to experience a cyber-terrorism incident, the potential impacts are so great that steps are being taken to prevent such an occurrence. Information systems coordinating transport, food, banking telecommunications and pharmaceutical sectors are critical to restoring order following an emergency, but they are also potential terrorist targets where massive social or economic disruption is the goal.
The Australian High Tech Crime Centre, hosted by the AFP, is a partner in the Joint Operating Arrangement, a group also consisting of ASIO and DSD and is the first line of response to any potential attack to Australia’s national information infrastructure.
The AHTCC also participates in the Commonwealth’s Information Infrastructure Protection Group, which provides advice on the electronic systems underpinning critical National Information Infrastructure services as well as the E-security Coordination Group, coordinated by the Department of Communications Information Technology and the Arts, which seeks a holistic approach to the security of cyberspace and e-commerce.
The Centre is also actively engaged in the Banking and Finance Advisory Group and has its own joint banking and financial sector investigations team, consisting of Federal and State Police, as well as investigators from the major banks including, Commonwealth Bank, ANZ, National Australia Bank, Westpac and Suncorp Metway. This team facilitates information exchange and identification of criminal trends, and investigates internet banking fraud, phishing and related criminal matters, including fraudulent job recruiting websites.
It has a number of matters currently before the courts and recently participated in a worldwide sweep that closed down 1400 phishing sites, 13 of them based in Australia.
The AFP is also a member of the Business Government Advisory Group on National Security, and the Trusted Information Sharing Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection (TISN).
The Business Government Advisory Group promotes high level information exchange on issues related to national security among senior political, law enforcement and business leaders. It met, most recently, in July this year and addressed issues such as the protection of places of mass gatherings, legal frameworks affecting business cooperation on national security, anti-money laundering legislation and infrastructure protection.
The work of the BGAG complements that of the Critical Infrastructure Advisory Council and the Trusted Information Sharing Network (TISN), which facilitates the sharing of generic security threat and vulnerability information in relation to critical infrastructure.
Project Griffin
The effectiveness of collaboration between law enforcement and the business community was well demonstrated during the London bombings. ‘Project Griffin’ was an initiative engaging the business community to protect London’s ‘ring of steel’, companies which produce 8 per cent of Britain’s GDP. These companies are involved in weekly telephone hook ups to receive briefings on threat levels.
In addition, security staff from 90 companies are trained in bomb response.
After the London bombings, they helped to cordon off affected areas, freeing up police to perform their emergency response duties. London now has 2000 security guards trained under the Project.
So, by working closely with business, we can broaden our understanding of the security risks and implications for business and, in return, business can partner with law enforcement agencies to enhance the coordination of efforts to strengthen global responses to international security threats.
Social challenges in countering terrorism
Terrorism is different from other crime types, in that it involves fighting a notion or ideology. To do this we need to understand more about the drivers of terrorism and a most important component involves understanding more about cultural differences and addressing prejudices in society. The AFP’s work with the Islamic community is aimed at breaking down some of the ignorance and misunderstanding in our own community.
There is the challenge of managing community expectations.People have high expectations that law enforcement agencies will be able to prevent terrorism attacks. Yet at the same time, there is also strong concern in the community about the introduction of tougher security measures, new counter terrorism legislation and new powers to police terrorism.
Finding the right balance is not always easy.
An illustration of this is the findings of a recent survey by online travel directory TotalTravel.com[1] which found Australians divided on whether security at airports was now too tough, or too relaxed. It showed 40 per cent of respondents thought airport security checks were slack and they felt unsafe, while 26 per cent said they believed there was overkill with security measures.
Now, to discuss the challenges presented by media reporting of terrorism.
As the object of terrorism after all is to “kill one and frighten ten thousand”, the media would do well to ensure that it does not propagate the terrorist mantra in pursuit of sensational headlines. A recent example was the reporting earlier this month on the supposed threat against the English and Australian cricket teams. The reports referred to allegations made by an alleged friend of one of the July 2005 bombers. Making headlines out of supposition or propaganda not only fuels fear but there can be unforseen consequences such as economic loss that will achieve the terrorists’ objectives anyway.
The shape of future challenges
As we operate in a broader, global community now in regard to social, cultural and economic issues, there are new and emerging issues. We must be mindful that pressures on marginal and susceptible economies will fuel instability.
With changing trends in demographics, the environment and health, there are sometimes substantial shifts in government priorities and resource allocations, with subsequent implications for law and order.
It appears that conflicts driven by religious, ethnic, economic and political disputes are also likely to continue.
Trans-national crime will be facilitated by rapid and largely unrestricted flows of information, capital, ideas, goods, services and people across borders.
Crime types such as identity theft, cyber crime, network invasions and systems viruses can also be expected to escalate. In 2004 an estimated $140 billion was lost due to computer crime. This was larger than the projected profit from the global narcotics trade. It will take less than five minutes for a new on-line home user system to potentially be compromised. In developing nations, internet and mobile use is growing, but commensurate security measures and legal frameworks for the new technologies and their risks are not necessarily being adopted in developing countries. These figures indicate a high degree of vulnerability, commercial loss, and potential global growth in cyber crime, especially through the internet.
Conclusion
Over the past five years, many positive advances on the national security front have been made with significant, dedicated resources and investment directed to identifying and combating terrorism.
The whole-of-government approach to national security and strengthened relations with our overseas partners are integral to that response.
As we look to the future, private organisations will become increasingly vital in that collaboration, helping to protect iconic and major infrastructure targets and target terrorist financial bases plus disrupt all forms of transnational crime. We need to work with our partners overseas and at home to ensure our structures are robust.
Thank you