Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) - "Building National Security: domestic and international policing"
Commissioner Mick Keelty APM
Conrad Treasury
George Street
Brisbane QLD 7000
Thursday 29 May 2008
12.00hrs – 13.00hrs
E&OE
Check Against Delivery
At the outset I’d like to acknowledge the traditional owners of the land on which we meet today, the Turrbal people, and acknowledge their elders, both past and present, and their abiding connection to this land.
I’d like to thank Dr Bergin (Dr Anthony Bergin, Director of Research Programs, ASPI) for the invitation to speak to you today and thank you Allen (Mr W. Allen Koehn, Managing Partner Public Sector, Unisys Asia Pacific) for that warm introduction.
Let me begin with a statement of the obvious. Terrorism is a transnational crime. That’s a fact. It crosses domestic and international jurisdictional boundaries and to successfully combat it, we need both national and international cooperation.
A connected, whole-of-government approach is essential to respond to, and disrupt, the threat of terrorism within Australia.
The AFP’s domestic security arrangements are complemented by our offshore strategy to combat the regional threat from terrorism. We have strong working relationships with our offshore partners and we interact and cooperate closely with our global counterparts in the area of counter terrorism, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region.
The destruction of the World Trade Centre in New York and, closer to home, both Bali bombings and the bombing of our Embassy in Jakarta, are evidence enough that terrorism is transnational in nature and requires a global response.
But it is important to continually review the effectiveness of our current model. The AFP has contributed to the current Homeland and Border Security Review being conducted by Mr Ric Smith, who is well known to everyone here.
The AFP initiated, at our own expense and concern, a review of the intersection of intelligence and law enforcement operations conducted by an eminent panel comprising Sir Lawrence Street as Chair; Mr Martin Brady, the former Director-General of the Defence Signals Directorate; and former NSW Police Commissioner Ken Moroney.
We are also providing full support and cooperation with the review being conducted by the Hon. John Clarke, QC, into the matter concerning the investigation of Dr Mohammad Haneef.
It is not unreasonable for the community to expect that we have a plan, and the ability, to respond to all sorts of threats to Australia’s national security. Although traditional threats like arms and diplomatic tensions between nation states remain a possibility – particular if disputes were to arise from resource security concerns, such as oil supplies and water scarcity – other kinds of threats like climate change, transnational crime and the use of the internet to commit crimes are new global phenomena that we must also address. The AFP is but one player in the provision of solutions to the threats.
Terrorism remains one of the greatest threats to Australia’s national security. If a terrorist or terrorist organisation were to successfully perpetrate an act of terrorism on Australian soil today, the social, economic and psychological consequences would be devastating.
The cost of the September 11 attacks to the U.S. economy, which killed more than 3,000 people, has been estimated at more than $100 billion.1
The July 2005 attacks in London are estimated to have cost UK tourism alone more than 300 million Pounds in lost revenue.2
I am not going to speculate on the cost to the Australian economy but it would be devastating and massive.
We shouldn’t lose sight of the fact that despite Australia not having experienced an act of terrorism on our own soil, a recent conviction demonstrates that Australia remains a terrorist target.
There is no room for complacency, and we must manage what I call “alert fatigue” to ensure our layers of security are effective.
Earlier this week, ASIO Director-General, Paul O’Sullivan, speaking at the Budget Estimates hearing, told the Committee that during 2008 alone there have been approximately 70 terrorist attacks in 23 countries which have resulted in almost 800 deaths and approximately 1,500 injuries.3
The jihadist movement is global, and violence is at its core.
The Australian community holds an expectation that the AFP and our security partners will prevent an act of terrorism from occurring on Australian soil. It is not an unreasonable expectation, but it is also an immensely challenging one to meet.
In his responses to Senate Estimates, Paul O’Sullivan also said, “While it is now much harder for known extremists to travel undetected, all countries remain vulnerable to some degree to an attack launched by foreign based extremists. Areas where violent jihadists have a strong presence – often areas of insurgency or armed conflict – continue to attract individuals from around the globe.”4
This places immense pressure on investigators to get it right first time and every time. Terrorism investigations are dealing with complex, and often new and untested legislation, and investigators are faced with large volumes of intelligence and evidentiary material to analyse, to correlate and to understand in a very short period of time.
The AFP relies on strong cooperative, coordinated and consultative relationships. Underpinning these relationships are Memoranda of Understanding with each state and territory for the establishment of Joint Counter-Terrorism Teams.
The Joint Counter Terrorism Teams have been in existence since 2003 and consist of representatives from the AFP and the relevant jurisdictional police, and other agencies. Their role is to investigate terrorism-related matters with a focus on preventative operations.
As I mentioned earlier, protecting Australia from terrorism can not be achieved solely by the efforts of Australia’s law enforcement agencies. It also requires close working relationships with Australia’s intelligence community – in particular, ASIO.
The Street Review was delivered to us in February this year and it confirmed that a close, collaborative arrangement with ASIO, with clearly delineated responsibilities, will be essential to facilitate the exchange of information to enable joint operations and to protect Australia from potential terrorist attacks.
Although the AFP already has a well-developed and productive working relationship with ASIO, that relationship will be further enhanced by the implementation of the recommendations from the Street Review, which in addition to the AFP and ASIO also looked at the role of the CDPP.
In fact, to date many of the recommendations have been implemented or are about to implemented, including:
- High level staff exchanges to better understand each other’s protocols and procedures. ASIO’s Director-General and I are both keen to continue and perhaps even expand this interagency arrangement;
- We’re progressing the development of a new Joint Operations Protocol;
- The involvement of the National Counter-Terrorism Committee in coordinating national counter-terrorism exercises to test response capabilities of agencies; and
- The development of new Counter-Terrorism Prosecution Guidelines.
There is of course more to be done to fully implement the valuable suggestions made by Sir Lawrence Street, and we continue to work towards that. But, most importantly, the public is entitled to know that our national security agencies are functioning at the highest levels both individually and collectively, and the measures I just highlighted contribute to a more effective, accountable and coordinated response to terrorism.
Despite these measures, there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution to the problem. Our diverse regional and demographic variations make that kind of approach impossible. Australia’s strategy needs grassroots solutions, similar, perhaps, to those adopted by the UK and the Netherlands.
I have always said that our Muslim communities themselves are best placed to identify individuals at risk of adopting extreme Islamist beliefs. They are also best-placed to minimise the influence of extremist ideologies in their own communities. Any national strategy must include ‘buy-in’ from the Muslim community for the implementation of counter-terrorism policies.
It is, however, a two-way street and the AFP have embarked upon a program to deliver that outcome, which I will explain shortly.
Policy coordination for counter terrorism relies on a strong cooperative partnership between the Australian Government and the States and Territories.
The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet takes the lead role for counter-terrorism policy coordination in order to optimise arrangements for strong policy coordination between the Australian Government, the States and the Territories.
Prime Minister and Cabinet recently established an Office of National Security to ensure a continued high level of coordination and reinforce a whole-of-government approach to national security issues.
Within the Australian Government, the Australian Government Counter Terrorism Policy Committee was formed in September 2002. The Committee meets every two months, or as needed, to provide an opportunity for senior level policy coordination on counter terrorism issues.
The National Counter Terrorism Committee is the primary policy committee with responsibility for developing Australia’s counter-terrorism arrangements.
But as I mentioned earlier, these arrangements are currently being reviewed by Ric Smith and we look forward to seeing his recommendations.
An often over-looked partner in protecting Australia from terrorism is the wider Australian community. The community is a valuable source of information regarding terrorist-related activity, and we can only obtain that information and gain the community’s support for our counter-terrorism activity through meaningful engagement.
Community engagement is a rapidly growing component of the Joint Counter-Terrorism Teams.
At the AFP, we actively engage with the Australian Islamic community through a diverse range of programs.
While various liaison activities have been in place since 2001, eighteen months ago we created the Islamic Liaison Team working out of our Melbourne office on a trial basis. That has resulted in the AFP hosting an IFTAR dinner during Ramadan last year which was attended by more than 350 Muslim Community Leaders. It has also resulted in a partnership between ourselves and the Essendon football club. We were focused on young Muslim students and Muslim footballers in trying to reach out and see the benefits of positive relationships with Police. We’re doing that in partnership with the Victorian Police.
We are keen not to confuse the community through a duplication of effort, so many of these initiatives are delivered in partnership with our state and territory policing colleagues, complementing their own community policing measures.
I regularly meet with Leaders of the Australian Muslim Community in all capital cities to discuss community concerns regarding a host of issues including how global events might be impacting on Australian Muslim communities and how government legislation may also affect them.
I place a lot of value in the diverse ethnic and religious characteristics of the Australian community. In order to improve our service to the community, the AFP has developed strategies to enhance organisational awareness of cultural diversity, facilitating effective dialogue on relevant issues.
Religious and cultural awareness training is a core component of the training undertaken by new recruits to the AFP.
The AFP’s Culture and Language Centre coordinates training in Mandarin, Arabic, Thai and Indonesian. Since 2005, more than 300 members have undertaken training in one or more of these languages.
The face of policing right around the world is constantly changing. Although in a liberal democracy law enforcement agencies administer the policies of the government of the day and uphold laws passed by governments, they also must meet the high expectations placed on them by the community.
This is no small task to achieve.
Modern police forces must remain flexible, adaptable and innovative if they are to successfully serve the people.
In any society there will always be an element of mistrust that we have to overcome. I believe openly engaging with the community serves to help break down the negative perceptions, while also serving to educate police officers on the everyday issues faced by communities.
Unfortunately, many migrants who come to Australia have had negative experiences with ‘authority figures’, including police, in their home countries, and this is manifested in distrust of police when they arrive in Australia.
To overcome this, we, as police officers, must work tirelessly with the community to win its trust.
One thing however that the Islamic Liaison Team does not do is use its access to, and time spent with, the Muslim community – or any other community group.
The Islamic Liaison Team's community feedback reveals growing beliefs and perceptions amongst Islamic communities that they are the primary focus of Australian law enforcement agencies and under constant observation. These beliefs and perceptions are contributing to a lack of understanding of the AFP's role and responsibilities.
Discussions with communities reveal that counter terrorism law enforcement can result in perceptions of marginalisation and isolation by some communities. There is a need for law enforcement strategies to counter potential radicalisation rhetoric to which some individuals may be subjected.
Part of our law enforcement strategy is to establish relationships with communities through consultation and development of collaborative activities and events to bring greater awareness of the AFP’s role and responsibilities and to bring cultures together.
The Muslim communities in Australia deserve praise for their huge efforts to delegitimise efforts to radicalise young Muslims, while also working to educate the wider community on Islam.
At the end of the day, our job as police is to enforce the law of the land. In Australia, that law affords majority and minority groups equally certain rights of protection, and Muslims are as entitled to the same protection under the law as other members of the community.
The Islamic Liaison Team, as a mechanism to engage with the community, is not a new concept. Law enforcement agencies in Australia and overseas have used various strategies to engage with the community for many years. The Police Citizens Youth Club, for example. Engagement with young people and the wider community is not a post-9/11 idea.
In Australia our efforts are focused on preventing a terrorist attack from occurring. As such, we have a slightly different view of the strategic landscape.
We shouldn’t forget that both the US and the UK have had longer histories with terrorism. We are developing a response that is unique to our community.
Twenty years ago the greatest threat to the UK’s national security was the IRA.
Through the 1970s and 1980s the US was consistently a target of terrorism, both on homeland soil and international interests.
In Australia, we simply cannot import counter-terrorism models without understanding the context in which they were developed.
While we have been fortunate that there have been no terrorist attacks on Australian soil, regionally there have been a number of attacks, including:
- The 2002 Bali bombing which killed 202 people;
- The 2003 bombing of the JW Marriott Hotel in Jakarta which killed 12 people and injured 144;
- The 2004 attack on the Australian Embassy in Jakarta which killed 12 people and injured 2; and
- The second Bali bombing in 2005 which killed 23 people and injured a further 104 people.
In all of these incidents, the AFP worked closely with Indonesian law enforcement agencies to assist the investigations.
We continue to work proactively with Indonesia and other countries in the Asia-Pacific region, such as the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Cambodia, as a prevention strategy. We have worked hard to build and maintain strong, productive relationships that facilitate the exchange of intelligence which support law enforcement activities and enhance the capacity of law enforcement within the region to combat the threat of terrorism. In fact, two weeks ago I was in Brunei to sign an MoU with the Royal Brunei Police Force.
Some key initiatives have arisen from the close relationships, including:
- The creation of regional training institutions, such as the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation;
- The development of specialist forensic and technical facilities for explosives, DNA and computer forensics;
- The implementation of joint investigative teams;
- The deployment of a purpose-built case management and information sharing system; and
- The implementation of an exercise regime to test capacity.
These initiatives have already begun to have an impact on detecting and disrupting terrorist activity within the region.
The AFP interacts and cooperates closely with its global counterparts in the area of counter-terrorism. We have officers on attachment to the London Metropolitan Police Counter-Terrorism Command as well as the FBI.
We also work closely with all Police services across the Pacific on a bilateral basis and also through the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police Secretariat in order to build relationships and strengthen not only the rule of law across the region, but also its social fabric.
The Pacific Island Chiefs take a direct interest in issues as diverse as Aids control, corruption and policing ethics, representing an ideas forum for the creation of intellectual capital on future development of the Pacific. I am proud of the AFP’s role in supporting the secretariat and revitalising its operation over the past four years through the provision of targeted funding and secondment of a full time member of the AFP.
The Australian Government continues to work on its own National Security Statement, so I am not going to pre-empt the Prime Minister and talk about that at all, suffice it to say, the Australian National Security Statement is set in a different context to the recently released UK National Security Strategy – although I have no doubt comparisons will be made when the time comes.
I’d like to talk briefly about the approach taken to countering extremism in some other western countries. Specifically, in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the United States and Canada.
After the London bombings on 7 July 2005, the UK Government concluded that defeating terrorism in the UK was going to require a long term strategy that addressed the growing threat of British-based extremists.
Since 2005, and in particular after the foiled transatlantic aircraft plot in August 2006, the UK has introduced a number of measures designed to stop individuals becoming or supporting violent extremists, including:
- Tackling disadvantage and addressing issues such as inequalities and discrimination which may contribute to radicalisation;
- Actively operating to change the environment in which extremists operate so as to deter those who facilitate and encourage people to become terrorists;
- Engaging proactively with the Muslim community by challenging the ideologies held by extremists that justify their use of violence and creating a forum in which Muslims can discuss and challenge these ideas openly; and
- Surveying the community to measure its cohesiveness and thereby identify areas requiring policy attention.
The Netherlands Government is taking a two-pronged approach to countering extremism. First, the prevention of radicalisation, and second, the prevention of polarisation. The Netherlands’ strategy was triggered by the murder of Theo Van Gogh in 2004, and it acknowledges that the Netherlands is at risk from right-wing extremism.
The Netherlands’ strategy has three objectives:
- prevention – the introduction of a policy aimed at increasing the resilience and social capital of individuals and groups who might be susceptible to polarisation and radicalisation;
- signalling – a strategy to establish early warning mechanism that identify young people who are beginning to display the early signs of polarisation and radicalisation. The responsibility for identifying those at risks rests with police, local government and professionals; and
- Intervention – the isolation or containment of individuals who have become radicalised, resulting in prosecution where someone has engaged in illegal activity or deportation for non-citizens.
In October 2007 the US Government released the National Strategy for Homeland Security, which includes a counter-radicalisation strategy.
There are three important elements of the US strategy: to better understand the phenomenon of radicalisation; to enhance the ability of the Department of Homeland Security to counter radicalisation; and a proactive approach to community engagement.
The Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis created a new branch that is focused exclusively on extremism and radicalisation in the United States.
The Department has begun to work closely with state and local-based law enforcement agencies to recognise the early signs of radicalisation and to promote outreach programs to vulnerable communities.
Obviously at the AFP we will continue to follow outcomes of the UK National Security Strategy.
Although Canada is yet to release a formal counter-extremism strategy statement, the arrest of 17 Canadians in 2006 on terrorism offences led the Canadian Government to develop five interdepartmental working groups to consider the potential for home-grown terrorism.
Canada’s national security policy includes a Cross-Cultural Roundtable, created to discuss matters of national security. Members come from Canada’s ethno-cultural and religious communities, including Muslims.
It is important to note here that Australia, the US and the UK, in particular, can and do learn from the distinctive circumstances and experiences of others. For example, we have learned a lot from the UK about home-grown enclaves, while the UK and the US have learned a lot from our style of assistance and cooperation with other countries.
At the AFP, we actively seek to learn from the experiences of other countries, particularly Indonesia, the UK and the US, as part of a strong and underpinning international engagement strategy.
In conclusion, as I said in the opening remarks, terrorism is transnational in nature with links within different countries. One of the best examples I can give you of that is the response to the Danish cartoons. It was a response that didn’t have, necessarily, any communication attached to it. It was a response that was initiated by human beings on what they collectively thought was a common purpose that didn’t require a conspiracy or an agreement to create that response.
Australia’s national security is a multi-dimensional co-operative arrangement with domestic and international aspects. The national security framework is underpinned by well-developed and productive working relationships both here Australia and overseas.
As I said, there has not been a fundamental shift in the global threat of terrorism. The threat is still real and Australia remains a target.
So with that I will close and open it up to questions.
[END]
References
- Milken Institute research report: ‘The Impact of September 11 on U.S. Metropolitan Cities’, January 2002, quoted in U.S. Government Accountability Office report, ‘Impact of Terrorist Attacks on the World Trade Centre’, May 2002, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02700r.pdf
- Tourism Industry Emergency Response Group (TIER) study, November 2005, accessed at http://www.hospitalitynet.org/news/4024002.search?
query=tourism+industry+emergency+response+group
Tourism Industry Emergency Response (TIER) group comprises a group of organisations involved directly in UK tourism, including British Airways, the Department of Culture, Media and Sport, VisitBritain, London Development Agency. - Hansard, Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Estimates, 26 May 2008, p49
- Hansard, Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Estimates, 26 May 2008, p49